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Introduction  
2017 marks the 50th anniversary of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 40 
years of the dialogue partnership between ASEAN and the European Union (EU). This 
longstanding partnership has its trials and tribulations. While economic ties between the two blocs 
have progressed steadily and diplomatic and political relations have broadened, EU-ASEAN 
cooperation has not reached its full potential and has plenty of room for growth.  
 
In May 2015, the EU issued a Joint Communication on its relations with ASEAN entitled “The 
EU and ASEAN: A partnership with a strategic purpose”. In this Communication, the EU 
acknowledged that “it has a strategic interest in strengthening its relationship with ASEAN 
because ASEAN combines high rates of economic growth as well as economic dynamism, and 
that it is also at the heart of the efforts to build a more robust regional security order in the wider 
Asia Pacific.” It added that the EU therefore has a huge stake in the success of ASEAN, and that a 
united and self-confident ASEAN is not only in the direct interest of the citizens of the region, 
but also of the EU. 
 
While the EU has a paper articulating its interest and objectives towards ASEAN, unfortunately, 
ASEAN despite the importance of the EU as its one of its most important  trading and 
investment partner, does not yet have a common strategy or coherent policy towards the EU. This 
of course has very much to do with the fact that ASEAN is a much looser, non-legalistic inter-
governmental bloc whose cooperation is consensus driven and consultative and more 
differentiated rather than homogenized.  But it is also due in part to the fact that the EU is not 
widely perceived as a security actor in a region where security is closely tied to the geopolitics of 
power balancing.  In addition, it is also true that while the EU speaks with one voice when it 
comes to the areas of trade, it still lacks a strong, coherent foreign and security policy. The EU 
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therefore is seen predominantly as an economic player in Asia and without a deep reflection on 
what the EU’s security and strategic interests are in Asia, and what are the capabilities that it can 
bring to the table, the EU’s engagement with Asia and ASEAN will remain less than optimal. 
 
However, the phenomenal rise of China, the election of Donald Trump as president of the US, 
and the British vote to leave the EU and a confluence of factors provide both challenges and 
opportunities for the EU and ASEAN to re-examine their partnership and bring this to a different 
level.  And can an EU-ASEAN partnership with a strategic purpose be achieved? 
 
What Strategic Purpose? 
While both the EU and ASEAN are very different in terms of institutional set-up, they have both 
benefitted from globalization and free trade and see themselves as important anchors in 
underpinning peace and stability in their respective regions.  The European integration project was 
hailed as the peace project that has transformed the relations between the member states such that 
war between them is unthinkable, while ASEAN has played an important role in confidence 
building amongst its member states and at the same time providing member states with a platform 
to engage the major powers in the region.  
 
ASEAN has through its dialogue partnerships with all major powers and in creating forums such 
as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the East Asia Summit 
(EAS) managed to portray itself as at the centre of regional architectures in the Asia-Pacific. 
ASEAN’s centrality in these regional architectures was reflected in the fact that these forums are 
“led” by ASEAN and its member states in the way the cooperation is structured - weakly 
institutionalized based on the ASEAN way. These ASEAN-led multilateral forums co-exist with 
the various bilateral US-led alliances (US-Japan, US-Korea, US-Australia, etc), and are given an 
aura of respectability since they are the only “multilateral” games in town able to accommodate all 
major players despite their differences.  ASEAN is seen as an honest broker and interlocutor 
providing a platform for dialogue and cooperation.  
 
However, as the competition between China and the US intensified and the Southeast Asian 
region became an area of strategic rivalry, ASEAN now faces the risk of being divided. A divided 
ASEAN would risk losing its centrality.  This is where other major powers such as the EU can 
become useful players in helping ASEAN stay united to shore up those multilateral forums that 
constitute part of the regional order. The EU in particular has been a champion of regionalism and 
multilateralism, and it is therefore in ASEAN’s interest to strengthen its engagement with the EU 
for these reasons. 
 
The strategic value of the EU is often underappreciated because the EU as explained above is 
often seen only as an economic power. The EU is perceived as not having a coherent or 
autonomous foreign and security policy, and is often seen as closely aligned to the US because of 
the historical transatlantic ties. This has led many in ASEAN to question the role that the EU 
could really play, especially when it comes to managing the complex relations between the US and 
China.  
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However, this might be set to change. In the face of an increasingly contested international order 
and with an unreliable, transactional America under Trump, the EU has realized the need to move 
towards strategic autonomy.  This means building up capabilities to assume responsibilities not 
only for its own security but to also play an active part in international peace and stability.  
 
Six months into his presidency, President Trump has shown the world his narrow vision, his 
readiness to abdicate global leadership and his disregard for allies – all he wants is a “good deal” 
for America, whatever that means.  This has led Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany to make a 
clarion call for the Europeans to take destiny in their own hands.  
 
Even before the triumph of Trump, the EU Global Strategy in 2016 had already called on EU 
member states to articulate “an appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy” that is 
important for Europe’s ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond the 
borders. 
 
Pathways to Strategic Relevance – Embracing a pluralistic, rules-based order 
With ASEAN in need of support for its centrality and the EU serious about its strategic autonomy 
the time is ripe for EU and ASEAN to re-evaluate  their partnership not only for mutual benefit, 
but also to assess how they can work together to support a rules-based order that is increasingly 
pluralistic, and not hegemonic.  As the dominant western-centric order is increasingly challenged 
by other non-western powers, at a time when the US is also increasingly reluctant to shoulder the 
global responsibilities of maintaining this order, it is time to conceive a more pluralistic order 
where there are competing centres of influence and based on functional leadership. However, for 
pluralism not to degenerate into anarchism, rules and institutions become ever more important.   
 
To become players of strategic relevance requires first and foremost a cohesive and united 
ASEAN, and a coherent and united EU. The EU efforts in helping ASEAN and its member states 
build capacity towards its economic integration goals is an important contribution towards 
ASEAN’s cohesion.  At the same time, ASEAN’s reluctance to admit the EU as a member of the 
East Asia Summit (EAS) thus far in one way or other relates to the question of EU’s strategic 
autonomy. Can the EU help to strengthen the EAS role as the region’s only leaders-led forum that 
can help manage the region’s strategic risks?  
 
The EU and ASEAN needs to raise its longstanding inter-regional dialogue as an important 
platform for both to reaffirm their regional identities.  This inter-regional dialogue has to be 
enhanced and strengthened.  More importantly, for the dialogue to focus on substance rather than 
form, there is a need to accept that since both regional blocs are fundamentally different in their 
set up, it means that in these meetings, while ASEAN will be represented by all 10 member states 
and the ASEAN Secretariat, on the EU side, not all EU member states will be present as on some 
issues, member states have chosen to delegate their authority and representation to the EU 
institutions.  
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The substance that the EU and ASEAN need to work on should converge on two broad areas of 
common interest: 
• Keeping protectionism in check by stepping up efforts in their FTA negotiations; and 
• Managing risks emanating from non-traditional security issues such as climate change, 
large scale migration and jihadist terrorism.  
 
Beyond increasing the regularity and substance in their inter-regional dialogue, the EU and 
ASEAN should also step up their collaboration in ASEAN-led institutions, and also in the Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) that owes its genesis to the roles played by Singapore and ASEAN, and 
in which the EU has been involved and active in the beginning to breathe life into its 1994 New 
Asia Strategy. 
 
The ASEAN Regional Forum – back to the future 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was initiated by ASEAN in the early 1990s to ensure its own 
relevance in the post-Cold War era by intensifying dialogue on political and security affairs with its 
external partners. It was a platform for dialogue and consultation and to enmesh key players in the 
Asia-Pacific in a security partnership that would enhance the strategic equilibrium in the region by 
promoting norms of self-restraint and the non-use of force.  
 
There are supposedly three stages in the development of ARF – promotion of confidence building 
measures, development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms and development of conflict 
resolution mechanisms. 
 
While being criticized for being a talk shop, the ARF remains one of the few security discussion 
forums in the Asia Pacific that encompasses all the major powers.  From the primary objective of 
alleviating the strategic uncertainties in the post-Cold War security environment through dialogue, 
it has expanded its range of activities to facilitate cooperation in non-traditional security issues 
from Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crimes to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Relief. 
 
Looking at the rising strategic distrust and increasing strategic uncertainties in the region, the ARF 
should go back to its original objective on working to alleviate strategic uncertainties.  Drawing 
from the CSCE (Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe) and OSCE (Organisation for 
Security Cooperation in Europe) experiences, the EU and ASEAN can launch and support new 
confidence building measures.  
  
Forging Functional Leadership within the ASEM Framework 
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) forum has evolved from an EU-ASEAN+3 meeting in 1996 
to one that is much more trans-continental in nature with 53 members comprising Asian members 
coming from all sub-regions of Asia and Oceania, and European members that are non-EU 
member states. With its informal and flexible framework, and emphasis on open-end dialogue, 
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ASEM can become a test-bed for EU and ASEAN to engender different forms of leadership 
needed to address challenges in a far more complex and contested world. 
 
Since its enlargement, and with its very broad agenda, ASEM has been grappling with how to 
fashion a more efficient way of working together to translate dialogue to real cooperation, and 
deliver not only political declarations but tangible benefits of cooperation.  There are also 
discussions on how to make ASEM more versatile to respond to different emerging priorities 
under a common framework.  Many proposals have surfaced from “Working Table” format to 
have smaller group discussions on different challenges to “issue-based leadership” revolving 
around a few priority areas.  It is time to truly put these ideas to the test.  
 
For example, with the US pulling out of the Paris Climate Agreement, China, the EU and India 
(the No 1, No 3 and No 4 greenhouse emitters) have said that they will step up their efforts in 
climate change action. Russia, Japan and Indonesia are also amongst the top 10 emitters. Within 
the ASEM, these six countries could for instance take the lead in following up on the Paris 
agreement and exercise leadership in the area of climate action.  
 
The trans-continental nature of ASEM and discussions on ASEM connectivity offers some 
synergies to China’s Belt and Road initiative to connect Asia and Europe.  Again the flexible and 
informal nature of ASEM would allow a few key member states – China, ASEAN (with its own 
ASEAN Master Plan on Connectivity), the EU, and others - a chance to coalesce around the 
“connectivity” agenda and exercise leadership in the area of infrastructure investments and 
people-to-people connectivity.  
 
ASEM with its inherent diversities comprising countries of all creeds and at different levels of 
development, almost a mini-UN, but less formal and more flexible, could become a platform for 
experimentation with different modes of governance, different configurations of actors and 
different constellations of interests and functions.  These experiments can become building blocks 
towards a functioning pluralistic world order. 
 
Obstacles along the Pathway 
The pathway towards strategic relevance is not without obstacles.  The most obvious of these is 
the propensity for both the EU and ASEAN to be self-absorbed and pre-occupied with their 
respective immediate neighbourhood. Domestic challenges in many Southeast Asian countries 
compound the problems of “introspection. Within the EU, the Brexit negotiations could end up 
all-consuming if it gets acrimonious and contentious. The Middle East and North Africa will 
continue to be the EU’s immediate priorities with climate change and state failures adding to a 
host of inter-related issues from ethnic conflicts, radicalisation to refugees and jihadist terrorists.   
 
Yet, despite these obstacles, the EU and ASEAN must not miss this window of opportunity to re-
evaluate and strengthen their engagement.  The common challenges they faced call for more 
engagement and more mutual learning.  At the strategic level, an unpredictable, transactional US, a 
muscular and assertive China, and a revanchist Russia creates uncertainties and raises the 
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propensity for conflicts. Deteriorating security environment in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific 
will have repercussions for both because of their increasing economic interdependence. Hence, 
the need to substantiate practical cooperation at various levels with efforts to strengthen ASEAN-
led institutions.   
 
 
Conclusion 
After 40 years of dialogue partnership, the time is ripe for a review of where this partnership is 
heading. The fact that the strategic environment they are in is entering a state of flux , and that the 
EU and ASEAN of today is a far cry from ASEAN and the European Economic Community of 
the yesteryears makes it all the more urgent for this review.  The EU is an important global actor 
in trade, innovation and development, and has vowed to work with other major powers to take 
leadership on the climate change agenda. It is also developing capacities in security and defence. 
While not a military superpower, the EU member states have considerable military resources 
which when pooled and coordinated is not insignificant. ASEAN, from an organization of weak, 
newly independent states, have grown in confidence and stature to foster security dialogue in the 
broader Asia-Pacific region.   
 
Both the EU and ASEAN must continue to build their capacities and capabilities in order to 
ensure their strategic relevance. In this endeavour there is much that they can do to support each 
other.   
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About the EU Centre 
Established in 2008, the EU Centre in Singapore was a joint project funded by the European 
Union (EU), the Nanyang Technological University (NTU) and the National University of 
Singapore (NUS). From 2017, the Singapore Management University (SMU) has also become a 
partner in contributing to the operations of the EU Centre. The EU is now a joint partnership of 
these three local universities. 
 
The primary mission of the EU Centre is to promote knowledge and understanding of the EU, its 
policies and development of its relations with Singapore and Southeast Asia through research, 
publications and different outreach programmes.  
 
The EU Centre is the Coordinator of a 3-year Jean Monnet Network grant (Sep 2016 – 2019). The 
Network comprising the EU Centre, University of Indonesia, University of Malaya and Maastricht 
University, will be jointly organising a series of programmes and activities tied to two research 
themes on Multiculturalism and Multilateralism. 
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